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ANNOUNCEMENTS
THE REVIEW announces the election to the Editorial Board of the
following members of the Third Year Class: Sanford D. Beecher,
Joseph Brandschain, J. Lawrence Davis, and John T. Griffith.
The resignation of William Glassman from the Editorial Board
has been tendered and accepted.
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THE MEANING AND EXTENT'OF THE REQUIREMENT OF GOOD
FAITH FOR A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE UNDER THE NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAw-What is the scope of the doctrine of good faith
as propounded by the Negotiable Instruments Law? Ever since the
law merchant the aim of the law has been to facilitate the exchange of
commercial instruments in order that business might be more readily
transacted. Therefore, under some circumstances the law has per-
mitted the transferee of commercial paper to acquire a title which is
superior to that of his transferor. The law has, however, taken care
of the maker as far as it has been deemed advisable and has allowed
him to set up his defenses to the instrument against all parties who
are not holders in due course. To achieve the favored position of a
holder in due course, it is fundamental that the transferee must act in
good faith. The question, therefore, of the extent of bona fides
required for such a privileged person is vital, for it must be deter-
mined whether the holder of a note need take it with good faith
toward the maker alone, or whether he must act bona fide in all of his
dealings with the instrument in order to acquire the privileges be-
stowed upon a holder in due course.
In a recent Pennsylvania case, Fehr v. Campbell,1 a note made by
the maker to his own order and indorsed by him in blank was secured
from him by the fraud of a corporation and was transferred by an
officer of that corporation to a holder who appropriated part of it to
the payment of the officer's personal obligation to him. This holder
sued the maker on the note and the lower court allowed the latter to
set up the fraud in the inception of the instrument, saying that the
actions of the plaintiff prevented him from being a holder in due
course. The upper court sustained the ruling of the lower court and
said that under the Negotiable Instruments Law a holder in due
course must take the instrument with good faith toward his immediate
predecessor in title as well as with good faith toward the maker.
For a proper comprehension of the doctrine of good faith under
the Negotiable Instruments Law, the inception and significance of the
doctrine of mala fides at the common law must first be understood.
The first indication that there was a doctrine of inala fides is found
1288 Pa. 549, 137 AtI. 113 (1927?
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reported in English cases of the early eighteenth century. It was
decided there for the first time 2 that the title of a holder of negotiable
paper, acquired before it was due, for valuable consideration, is not
affected by the fraud of a prior party, in the absence of bad faith on
the part of the holder in his acquisition of the paper.3 Later the rule
was varied and actual proof of bad faith was not essential to defeat
recovery by the holder; it was sufficient to impute bad faith to the
holder if from the circumstances an ordinary, prudent man would
have become suspicious.4 Finally, the English court turned back to
the original doctrine and the present rule was established which re-
quires actual proof of bad faith and admits proof of gross negligence
merely as evidence of bad faith.5 Though there were decisions to the
contrary before the passage of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the
prevailing rule in America followed that laid down in the later English
cases.6
From the foregoing paragraph it is evident that before the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law good faith was essential for recovery by the
holder of a note against the maker who had equitable defenses to the
instrument. It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine what acts
constituted good faith, or lack of it, at the common law. It was
established prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law that the holder
must have taken the instrument "in the regular course of business" in
order to be a holder in due course; in other words, he must have acted
as an ordinary business man would have acted with regard to the
instrument.7  If this test is applied to the case in question it is evident
that the plaintiff has not met its requirements. Here is a note
acknowledged to belong to the corporation by both transferor and
transferee, being accepted as to part of it in discharge of the personal
obligation of the officer of the corporation, the officer's only explana-
tion to the transferee being that the company owed him money and
that he would "fix it up" with them. Any ordinary business man
would have suspected the officer of the corporation under similar cir-
cumstances, and the holder of the instrument must be regarded as an
'Rightmire, The Doctriw of Bad Faith in the Law of Negotiable Instru-
ments, (192o) 18 MIcH. L. REv. 355, 356.
' Miller v. Race, i Burrow 452 (Eng. 1758) ; Grant v. Vaughn, 3 Burrow
1516 (Eng. 1764); Lawson v. Weston, 4 Espinasse 56 (Eng. i8or).
'Gill v. Cubit, 3 Barn. & Cress. 466 (Eng. 1824); Down v. Haling, 4
Barn. & Cress. 330 (Eng. 1825).
'Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & El. 87o (Eng. 1836) ; Uther v. Rich, io
Ad. & El. 784 (Eng. 1839); Arbouin v. Anderson, i Ad. & El. (N. S.) 498
(Eng. 1841).
'Fillebrown v. Hayward, 19o Mass. 472, 77 N, E. 45 (i9o6) ; Bradwell v.
Pryor, 22i Ill. 602; 77 N. E. iii5 (1906). See also, STORY, BILLs op EXCHANGE:
(4th ed. i86o) 194, 416.
'Kuhns v. Gettysburg Nat. Bank, 68 Pa. 445, 448 (1871); Garrard v.
Pittsburgh & Connellsville R. R., 29 Pa. 154 (1855); McConnell v. Hodson,
7 Ill. 640, 648 (1845) ; Roberts v- Hall, 37 Conn. 205 (187o) ; People v. Bank
of North America, 75 N. Y. 547 (1879).
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ordinary business man for the purpose of applying this test at com-
mon law.
Let us now turn to the Negotiable Instruments Law. For a
proper analysis of the cases since the passage of the Negotiable Instru-
inents Law, it is essential to find out what the Act regards as the
proper requisites of a holder in due course. Section 52 says, in part,
that a holder in due course must have taken the instrument in good
faith and with no notice of any defect in title or infirmity in it.
"Notice" is not defined in this section but the draftsman, Crawford,
says that Section 56 gives us the elements which constitute good faith.,
This section says that "to constitute notice of any infirmity in the
instrument or defect in title of the person negotiating it to him, the
person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of
the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in
taking the instrument amounted to bad faith." But as yet no satis-
factory result has been attained, for the meaning of "infirmity" is not
set forth. This word is not defined anywhere in the Act, but it is
used in conjunction with "defect in title." From a study of Sections
55, 56 and 57 it would seem that "defect in title" includes "infirm-
ity." 9 Since this is so, an understanding of what is meant by "defect
in title" will also illustrate what is meant by "infirmity." The term
"defective title" is explained in Section 55. This section says that
"the title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within
the meaning of this act when he obtained the instrument, or any signa-
ture thereto, by fraud, duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful
means, or for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in
breach of faith, or under such circumstances as amount to a fraud."
The use of the words "defective title" in this section is confusing.
The phrase merely means that the situations named in this section con-
stitute defenses to the maker against all parties who are not holders in
due course, or who do not claim through such a person. This partic-
ular section, however, still does not make it evident whether the situa-
tions named therein apply to the holder's actions toward the maker
solely, or whether they include his actions toward a predecessor in
title. A further examination must be made in order to find out what
the author of the Act himself meant by the phrase "defect in title."
For this purpose we must determine the source of the phrase. In the
English Bills of Exchange Act, drafted by Chalmers, the phrase
"defect in title" was used instead of "equity attaching to the bill,"
since "equity" was a term unknown in the law of Scotland, to which
the Bills of Exchange Act extends.' 0 The -natural connotation of
these words would not limit the equities to those of the maker; it
'CRAWFORD, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (4th ed. 1916) § 56.
'BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw (4th ed. 1926) 419.
"CHALMERS, BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT (8th ed. i919) 137. Lindley, J., in
Alcock v. Smith, [i89z] i Ch. 238 said that "defect of title" is an expression in
lieu of the phrase "subject to equities" which is an expression not adopted
because it is unknown to Scotch law.
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embraces all the equities attaching to the instrument including those of
the immediate predecessor in title.
With this idea in mind it must be determined whether the plaintiff
in the Pennsylvania case had notice of any equities attaching to the
bill. It is a well settled rule of law that one who takes negotiable
paper which the taker knows to be the property of a corporation for
the purpose of applying such paper to the personal use of one of the
officers of the corporation must inquire as to the authority of that
officer if he wishes to be protected from all defenses to the instru-
ment.11 It must be admitted that in almost all of the cases reported
the act of bad faith which prevented the owner from being a holder in
due course was toward a party to the suit then before the court, and
not, as here, toward an outside party, the corporation which held title
to the note when it was negotiated to the plaintiff. But this should
make no difference for the holder had notice of the equities of the
corporation when he took the note and that should be all that is neces-
sary. Such is the result obtained from a study of Sections 52, 55 and
56, and it is also the result obtained by employing Chalmers' interpre-
tation.' 2 This conception of the extent of the doctrine of good faith
is rather an innovation in the law, for although the language of the
courts had been broad enough to warrant such a view, the great major-
ity of the cases have not been exactly in point. Only two cases have
dealt with a situation where the party to whom the act of bad faith
was rendered was not a party to the suit. But it is submitted that
this doctrine of good faith does include the actions of the transferee
in all of his dealings with the instrument and that this Pennsylvania
case is an indication of the way courts in the future will handle the
situation.
Chief Justice Moschzisker found only one case reported with
facts almost identical to the case under discussion, and added research
since has not produced any more. In Fisk Rubber Company v.
Pinkey ' the circumstances on which the plaintiff's status as a holder
'Schmitt v. Potter Title & Trust Co., 6 Pa. Super. 3Ol (1915); Odd
Fellows Home of Pa. v. Velenchick Bros., 73 Pa. Super. 153 (1919); Ward
v. City Trust Co., i92 N. Y. 6i, 84 N. E. 585 (19o8) ; Fisk Rubber Co. vi
Pinkey, ioo Wash. 22o, 17o Pac. 581 (x918); Johnson-Kettel Co. v. Longley
Co., 207 Mass. 52, 92 N. E. 1835 (19io).
"Goodman v. Simonds, 2o How. 343 (U. S. 1857): "Every one must con-
duct himself honestly in respect to antecedent parties when he takes negotiable
paper, in order to acquire a title which shall shield him against prior equities."
Accord: Adams v. Ashman, 203 Pa. 536, 53 At. 375 (i9o2); Ozark Motor
Co. v. Horton, i96 S. W. 395 (Mo. App. 1917). See also Paika v. Perry, 225
Mass. 563; 114 N. E. 83o (1917): "In order to show that the defendant had
knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to
bad faith it is not necessary to prove that defendant knew the exact fraud
that was practised upon plaintiff by defendant's assignor, it being sufficient to
show that defendant had notice that there was something wrong about his
assignor's acquisition of title, although he did not have notice of the particular
wrong that was committed."
"Supra note ii.
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in due course hinged concerned a transaction between the plaintiff and
the president of a corporation, who in the transaction in question had
acted iilegally toward his company, neither the corporation nor its
president being parties to the suit, and the circumstances under inquiry
being distinct from the circumstances of the original fraud upon
which the defendant resists payment of the note. The court by a
unanimous vote reversed the decision of the lower court and held that
the plaintiff's bad faith toward the corporation in receiving the note
from its president in payment of his own personal debt subjected the
plaintiff to the defenses of the maker resting on the instrument, a con-
sequence of his not being a holder in due course. The court stigma-
tized the transaction before it as "out of the ordinary course of busi-
ness" saying that when paper is so acquired, "unless the authority of
the officer is made to appear by affirmative proof, the paper is subject
to defenses although in the hands of one who took it for value and
before maturity." When the court spoke of defenses it meant neces-
sarily defenses set up by the maker of the note, for in that case, as in
the present one, the maker was the defendant at bar. Though the
court cited the Negotiable Iiistrunments Law it did not go into an elab-
orate interpretation of its sections but based everything on Section 52
and the common law background.
The Washington case is in harmony with the Pennsylvania case
and requires a holder in due course to act bona fide in all of his deal-
ings with the instrument if he wishes to have the privilege bestowed
upon this favored class, of being free from defenses of the maker.
J.T.G.
JUDGMENT NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO IN PENNSYLVANA-The
common law rule as to when judgment non obstante veredicto may be
granted has undergone many alterations at the hands of the judges
and legislators of the United States. In Pennsylvania this change
has been especially marked: originally a test of the sufficiency of
pleadings, judgment non obstante veredicto has come to be a test of
the sufficiency of the evidence. Stated in general terms, Pennsylvania
courts grant judgment when supported by a great preponderance of
evidence, even though contrary to a verdict based on an appreciable
amount of testimony. The problem involved in applying this rule is
to define "preponderance" and "appreciable" so that these terms may
be applied to specific facts. Strong dicta in the recent case of Hartig
v. American Ice Co.' attempt to dissipate this difficulty, stating under
what circumstances judgment may be entered contrary to a verdict
supported by a presumption of law.
At common law, judgment non obstante veredicto was never
granted to the defendant.2 This remedy was available to the plaintiff
1290 Pa. 21, 137 Atl. 867 (1927).
' See generally, I FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 10.
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only when, after confessing the plaintiff's right of action, the defend-
ant relied on facts that, even if proved, would not constitute a valid
avoidance. If the jury, under these circumstances, rendered a ver-
dict for the defendant, the plaintiff, on application therefore,3 after the
verdict and before the judgment,4 could secure judgment in his favor,
von obstante veredicto.5
The right to give judgment non obstante veredicto on a point of
law reserved was granted to the courts of Philadelphia in 1825 8 and
extended to all the common pleas courts of the state in 1863.' A court
desiring to reserve a point of law directed a verdict for the plaintiff,
retaining the privilege of granting judgment non obstante veredicto
for the defendant.8 This procedure was followed in order that the
jury, in finding for the plaintiff, might specify the damages to which
he would be entitled were the point reserved decided in his favor.
*Courts were authorized to grant judgment non obstante veredicto
under still different conditions by the Act of April 22, x9o50 This
statute provided that whenever a point requesting binding instructions
had been either reserved or declined the party presenting the point
could move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The party
against whom judgment was entered in the lower court was permitted
to appeal to a higher court, moving for judgment in his favor based on
the evidence certified and transmitted by the lower court."0
It is interesting to note the sharp line of demarcation between
each rule and its successor. At common law, judgment non obstante
veredicto was based on the pleadings and granted to the plaintiff alone.
Under the Act of x863 it was based on the decision of a point of law
reserved and granted only to the defendant. Either party was en-
titled to judgment non obstante veredicto under the Act of 19o5, based
on whether the court should have granted a request for binding
instructions.
'See Notes, L. R. A. i916E, 828, 829; 12 L. . A. (N. s.) io21, 102.
'See NeilI v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co., 135 Ten. 28, 185 S.
W. 7ox (i916).
ICook v. Pearce, S Q. B. io44 (1843); Dewey v. Humphrey, 5 Pick. 187
(Mass. 1827); Bellows v. Shannon, 2 Hill 86 (N. Y. 1841).
OAct of March x, x825, P. L. 4I; re-enacted March 28, 1835, P. L. 88.
"Act of April 22, 1863, P. L. 5s4, PA. STAT. (West, 192o) § 173o9.
"In Morris v. Ziegler, 71 Pa. 450 (1872), Sharswood, J., said:
"When the jury finds a verdict for the defendant, there can be no
judgment entered upon a reserved point for the plaintiff. Such judgment
being without any verdict to support it, wants a legal foundation and is
therefore erroneous." Accord: RingIe v. Penna. R. R., 164 Pa. 529, 3o Atl.
492 (1894); Glading v. Frick, 88 Pa. 460 (i879).
'1905 P. L 286, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 17292.
"Act of April 2o, 1911, P. L. 70, PA. STAx. (West, 1920) § 12794, a sub-
sequent enactment, permitted either party to request judgment non obstante
veredicto based on a request for binding instructions, when the jury disagreed
on a verdict.
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As a result of the considerable volume of judicial opinion elicited
by the Act of 19o5, there was formulated a well recognized statement
of the general principles that govern a court in considering a motion
for judgment non obstante veredicto. In Dalns v. Kemble,"
Mitchell, J., commenting on the Act of 1905, said:
"It broadens the power of the judge in this respect, that
whereas heretofore the verdict was required to be for the plain-
tiff and the reservation to be of leave to enter judgment for the
defendant non obstante veredicto, now what is reserved is a
request for binding direction to the jury and may be for either
plaintiff and defendant. But though thus enlarged so as to in-
clude both parties, the power of the judge is the same as it was
before. He is to enter such judgment as would have been
entered upon the evidence ' 2 or in other words to treat the motion
for judgment as if it was a motion for binding instructions at
the trial, and to enter judgment as if such direction had been
given and a verdict rendered in accordance. What the judge may
do is still the same in substance, but the time when he may do it
is enlarged so as to allow deliberate review and consideration of
the facts and the law upon the whole evidence."
Although the general principles have been clearly expressed and
are followed by the Pennsylvania courts, considerable confusion exists
as to the exact facts that justify giving binding instructions Is or
granting judgment non obstante veredicto. Opinions in several lines
of cases express divergent views on this point.
The decision in Lonzer v. Lehigh Valley R. R. 4 has done much
to cause the confusion which the opinion in Hartig v. American Ice
Co.15 seeks to dissipate. In the former case, the defendant, relying
on a plea of contributory negligence, introduced many witnesses who
testified that the plaintiff's husband had been warned by the company
of the conditions that caused his death. They testified also that he
had disregarded this warning. To rebut this evidence, the plaintiff
introduced a fellow servant of the deceased, who testified that he, the
witness, had not received notice of the dangerous condition that caused
the accident. A verdict for the plaintiff was given in the lower court
and judgment entered accordingly.
11215 Pa. 410, 412, 64 Atl. 559 (19o6). See also American Car and Foun-
dry Co. v. Alexandrea Water Co., 221 Pa. 529, 70 "Atl. 867 (19o8).
"Act of i9o5, supra note 9.
"Pennsylvania courts apparently apply the same rule for weighing the
evidence in giving binding instructions and granting judgment non obstante
veredicto.
"i96 Pa. 6IO, 46 Atl. 937 (19oo).
'Supra note i.
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The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding that the
plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to take the case to the jury.
Mitchell, J., said:
"When the testimony is not in itself improbable, is not at
variance with any proved or admitted facts, or with ordinary
experience, and comes from witnesses whose candor there is no
apparent ground for doubting, the jury is not at liberty to indulge
in capricious disbelief. If they do so, it is the duty of the court
to set aside the verdict."
Holland v. Kindregan le was the only authority cited in support
of this proposition. A per curiam opinion in that case states that
evefi if there be a conflict of evidence, when that on one side amounts
to but a "scintilla," the judge is justified in withdrawing the case from
the jury and entering judgment for the opposite party. No authority
was cited.
In a number of instances,17 both previous to and following the
passage of the Act of 19o5, courts have disregarded the opinion of
the jury by entering judgment based on strong oral evidence opposed
only by a scintilla of proof. This rule is qualified somewhat by
Second Nationat Bank v. Hoffman, 8 in which case Brown, J., defines
"candor," as used in the rule of the Lonzer case, to mean "credibility,"
thus stating that the oral evidence must come from disinterested wit-
nesses.
The rule stated in the Lonzer case is opposed by a line of cases
holding that, regardless of how overwhelming the oral evidence may
be, the credibility of the witnesses must be considered by the jury.
9
Hartig v. American Ice Co. is in accord with this view,20 expressly
overruling the holding as to oral evidence stated in the Lonzer case.
The plaintiff, in Hartig v. American Ice Co., was employed by an
independent contractor engaged in erecting the defendant's building.
1655 Pa. i56, 25 AtI. 1o77 (1893).
'THazlett v. Director General, 274 Pa. 433, ix8 Atl. 367 (1922); Schley
v. Susquehanna & N. Y. R. R., 227 Pa. 494, 76 AtI. 207 (Ig1o) ; Heh v. Con-
solidated Gas Co., 201 Pa. 443, 5o AtI. 994 (go2); Devlin v. Beacon Light
Co., I98 Pa. 583, 48 Atl. 482 (i9oI); Wells v. New England Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 191 Pa. 207, 43 Atl. 126 (1899).
is229 Pa. 429, 78 Atl. OO2 (1911).
'In Reel v. Elder, 62 Pa. 308, 316 (i869) Sharswood, J., said:
"However clear and indisputable may be the proof, when it depends
on oral testimony it is nevertheless the province of the jury to decide, under
instructions from the court, as to the law applicable to the facts, and sub-
ject to the salutary power of the court to award a new trial." Accord:
Sieber v. Russ Bros., 276 Pa. 340, 12o Atl. 272 (1923); Holzheimer v.
Lit Bros., 262 Pa. i5o, io5 Atl. 73 (I918) ; Williams v. Ludwig Floral Co.,
252 Pa. 140, 97 AtI. 2o6 (1916) ; Spear v. Phila., W. & B. R. Co., 119 Pa.
61, 12 Atl. 824 (1888).
"But see dissenting opinion of Schaffer, J., 290 Pa., at 37.
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He was struck by a piece of pipe being unloaded from a truck on the
I remises, which truck the plaintiff alleged to be owned by, and used
in the business of, the defendant. In support of this contention, he
.ntroduced evidence to prove that the truck bore the defendant's name,
that the driver was the person unloading it at the time of the injury,
and that the contents of the truck were to be used in the erection of
the defendant's building. The defendant offered evidence, partly oral
and partly documentary, to show that it owned no trucks of the kind
described by the plaintiff. It also attempted to prove that it had
taken no part in the construction work and that its trucks did not haul
pipe to the building. The verdict was returned for the plaintiff, but
the lower court granted judgment non obstante veredicto for the
defendant on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show that the
man whose negligence caused the injury was an employee of the
defendant company acting within the scope of his employment.
The Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, ordered a new
trial. This decision was based on the fact that the name on the truck
raised the presumption 2 that the truck was owned by and being used
With the single exception of Pennsylvania, no jurisdiction seems to rec-
ognize these presumptions. It is true that brands on cattle have been pre-
sumed, by the majority of jurisdictions, to have been placed there by the owner
thereof, thus arriving at the conclusion that the owner of the brand owned
the particular animal. I WIGMO E, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923), § i5o. This
presumption has been extended to other chattels bearing the name of the osten-
sible owner, such as railroad rolling stock. Chicago City Ry. v. Carroll, 2o6
Ill. 318, 68 N. E. lO87 (19o3). In extending the theory, the courts are prone
to regard the evidence as a basis from which an inference may be drawn,
rather than as foundation for a presumption. As an example of this atti-
tude, Ladd, J., in Howell v. J. Mandelbaum & Sons, i6o Iowa, 119, 124, 140
N. W. 397 (913), said: "The name on tools or vehicles and articles gener-
ally is commonly accepted as indicating ownership, and, though not of much
probative value, it is enough, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to
carry the issue to the jury." In Eshenwald v. Suffolk Brewing Co., 241 Mass.
166, 134 N. E. 642 (1922), the fact that defendant's name was on a wagon
was admitted, along with other evidence, to prove his ownership.
There are Pennsylvania cases prior to Hartig v. American Ice Co. which
seem to indicate that a name on a business vehicle raises a presumption of
ownership. Holzheimer v. Lit Bros., supra, note 19, held that the name on
a commercial truck establishes presumptively the ownership and that the em-
ployee of the owner was in charge. Felski v. Zeidipan, 281 Pa. 419, 126 Atl.
794 (1924), does not decide the point of ownership, but indicates that a pre-
sumption is raised that the vehicle was being used in the business of the per-
son whose name it bore. In Williams v. Ludwig Floral Co., supra, note ig, it
was said that "from these facts a fair inference for the jury was that the
wagon was being operated in connection with appellant's business." The court
later refers to this deduction as a presumption, although terming it originally
an inference. Sieber v. Russ Bros. Ice Cream Co., supra note ig, holds that
the presence of defendant's name on the car plus the fact that it was loaded
with articles generally transported in connection with his business, was suffi-
cient basis for a presumption that he was the owner. In Thatcher v. Pierce,
281 Pa. I6, 125 At. 3o2 (1924), the ownership of the car being proven, the
court presumed that it was being used in the owner's business.
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for the benefit of the defendant company, which, together with the
other evidence tending toward that conclusion, was sufficient to take
the case to the jury.
Moschzisker, C. I., after discussing many of the cases relating to
the point, stated the general rules that should govern cases of this
type:
"When such presumptions so arise, they entitle plaintiff to
have his case submitted to the jury (a) unless plaintiff himself
shows in the presentation of his case that, as a matter of fact the
car did not belong to defendant or was not being used in his
business, or (b) unless, in the testimony produced, defendant is
able to point to evidence of 'indisputable physical conditions,' or
'facts,' or to show in the evidence some indisputable basis for
'mathematical tests,' which demonstratively overcome the pre-
sumption in plaintiff's favor. This is what is meant by evidence
so 'clear, positive, credible, uncontradicted and indisputable in
weight and amount as to justify the court in holding that a ver-
dict against [the defendant] must be set aside as a matter of
law;' for we have said in connection with the words just quoted
that: 'Where there is any uncertainty as to the facts or the infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom, the case is necessarily for the
jury. . . .' Another instance where a case otherwise for the
jury may be ruled as a matter of law in favor of defendant is
(c) where, in addition to the uncontradicted oral evidence on the
side of defendant, showing no liability, there is admittedly gen-
uine or unattacked documentary evidence which relieves defend-
ant from the possibility of liability. (For an instance of this
kind see Walters v. American Bridge Co. 22) ; and perhaps there
may be other instances of a character, generally speaking, like
those itemized as (a), (b) and (c) above, which do not occur to
our minds at the present time."
Grimes v. Pennsylvania Railroad,2 3 decided by the same court a
short time previously, presents the typical situation involving this
problem. The deceased was killed by one of the defendant's trains
at a railroad crossing. The plaintiff relied on the presumption that
one so struck used due care and caution. The defendant, attempting
to show contributory negligence, introduced evidence of the physical
surroundings of the accident to prove that if the deceased had used
' due care he would have been aware of the approach of the train and
= 2 34 Pa. 7, 82 At. 1io3 (1912). Defendani, in this case, relied on the
allegation that the injury was caused by an independent contractor, not a serv-
ant. This position was supported by what fairly may be described as "unat-
tacked documentary evidence." Moschzisker, J., in a concurring opinion, said:
"Under the evidence in this case I would not affirm. on the theory that the
defence was a matter of law for the court."
"289 Pa. 32o, 137 AtI. 451 (I927).
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would have escaped injury. The plaintiff secured a verdict in the
'ower court, but the judge gave judgment non obstante veredicto for
the defendant. In sustaining the judgment in the Supreme Court,
Sadler, J., said:
"If, however, there be, in addition to oral testimony, indis-
putable physical conditions, indicated by actual measurements,
maps or photographs, the existence of a fact ordinarily presumed
is negatived."
The opinion also states that "The negative testimony, being contro-
verted, does not amount to more than a 'scintilla,' and therefore can-
not prevail to establish an essential fact," thus seeming to refer to the
rule of Lonzer v. Lehigh Valley R. R. which the principal case
expressly overruled.
Considered in general terms, the rule as formulated in the Hartig
case states that some weighty evidence of reliability in addition to
strong oral testimony must be present before a court is justified in
disregarding a contrary presumption, and in entering judgment
despite the verdict or without the verdict of a jury. There is sub-
stantial authority for the rule,2 4 although most of the cases deal only
with the point in dispute, none of them expounding the law on the
subject as generally as is done in the dicta of the principal case.
Only a few cases take a directly contrary view, although it must
be considered that the line of cases following Lonzer v. Lehigh Valley
R. R. are in opposition to this rule, since they affirm a conflicting prin-
ciple. In Cromley v. Pennoa. R. R. 2" in circumstances similar to those
in Grines v. Penna R. R."8 and described under "(b)" in the extract
quoted from the opinion in the principal case, the court ruled it a
matter requiring the consideration of the jury. Similarly in Kreamer
v. Perkiomen R. R.,2 7 the judge would not consider mechanical calcu-
lations to establish the contributory negligence of the deceased. Like-
wise, in McCafferty v. Penna. R. R. Co.,"' physical facts having been
offered to overcome the presumption in favor of the plaintiff, Fell, J.,
said, "This presumption, having once arisen, remained until overcome
by countervailing proof. Whether it was so overcome was a question
of fact for the jury."
" Radziemenski v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 283 Pa. x82, 128 Atl. 735
(1925); Zotter v. Lehigh Valley R. R-, 28o Pa. 14, 124 Atl. 284 (924);
Cubitt v. N. Y. Central R. R., 278 Pa. 366, 123 Atl. 308 (1924); Seiwell v.
Hines, 273 Pa. 259, 116 Atl. 929 (1922) ; Lessig v. Reading Transit & Light
Co., 270 Pa. 299, 113 Ati. 382 (i92i); Bernstein v. Penna. R. R., 252 Pa.
581, 97 Atl. 933 (i916).
25212 Pa. 429, 6o Atl. ioo7 (i9o5).
"6Supra note 23.
2T214 Pa. 219, 63 Atl. 597 (1905).
293 Pa. 339, 44 Atl. 435 (I899).
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Little aid in the solution of this problem may be obtained by exam-
ination of the decisions in other jurisdictions. Three states use judg-
ment non obstante veredicto with less freedom than at common law,2"
while the Federal and Missouri Courts apply the common law rule."0
The heavy majority of jurisdictions permit either party to secure
judgment non obstante veredicto,s ' a number of them having adopted
statutes like the Pennsylvania Act of 1863.'2  Six states 83 have
indicated that judgment non obstante veredicto may be granted where
no evidence has been produced by either party.
In very few states can a precedent be found for giving judgment
contrary to a verdict supported by some evidence. A statute author-
izing the courts to enter judgment non obstante veredicto where, upon
the evidence, either party is clearly entitled to judgment has been
enacted in Minnesota.8 4  This statute was subsequently adopted in
North Dakota.85 Since the courts in Minnesota and North Dakota
have applied these statutes but infrequently in cases where the verdict
is supported by some evidence, no attempt has been made to establish
a rule for weighing the evidence. In addition to these decisions based
on statutes, several courts have exhibited a tendency to break down
the strict rule as to when judgment non obstante veredicto may be
granted. The defendant, in a Kansas case s introduced a deposition
that aided plaintiff's case rather than his own. Although this was the
only evidence offered by the defendant, a verdict was rendered in his
favor. The Supreme Court reversed the verdict giving judgment non
obstante veredicto for the plaintiff. In Michigan,87 in an action
against a doctor for malpractice, the only evidence offered for the
plaintiff was testimony of another doctor who stated that "it was pos-
sible" that an error in treatment had been made. A verdict having
Central Savings Bank v. O'Connor, x32 Mich. 578, 94 N. W. ii (1903)
(Judgment non obstanie veredicto may be granted only when a special verdict
is rendered, inconsistent with a general verdict); Best v. Baudry, 62 Mont.
485, 205 Pac. 239 (i922) (Judgment non obstante veredicto not warranted in
a law.case); Brewer v. Sammies Oil Corp., 241 S. W. 519 (Tex. Civ. App.,
igza) (Judgment non obstante veredicto cannot be rendered by trial Court).
.' 0 Slocum v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S. 364 (1933); Sternberg v.
Camden First National Bank, 28o Fed. 863 (C. C. A. 3d, i9n) ; King v.
Kaw Mo Co., 188 Mo. App. 235, 175 S. W. 77 (i915).
133 C. J. 179, ii8o.
333 C. J. 1186, 1187.
'Arkansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Wis-
consin. See 33 C. J. 1184 and footnote 49 for cases.
3 M3NN. LAWS 31895, c. 320. See Gorgenson v. Great Northern Ry., 138
Minn. 267, z64 N. W. 904 (1917); Cruikshank v., St Paul Ins. Co., 75 Minn.
266, 77 N. W. 958 (i899).
'N. DAx. LAWS i903, c. 63. See Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Schroeder, 12
N. Dak. IO, 95 N. W. 436 (1903); Richmire v. Andrews & Gale Elevator
Co., ii N. Dak. 453, 92 N. W. 839 (x9o2).
'Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. West, io8 Kan. 875, 196 Pac. io6i
(1921).
'Sherwood v. Babcock, 208 Mich. 536, I75 N. W. 470 (1939).
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been rendered for the plaintiff, the court granted judgment non
obstante veredicto in favor of the defendant.
The dicta in the Harlig case, it is submitted, should do much
toward resolving the confusion that exists in applying the Pennsyl-
vania rule of judgment non obstante veredicto. It voices the better
view in overruling Lonzer v. Lehigh Valley R. R. on the ground that
in following that case, the court infringes on the functions of the jury.
Nor does it go to the other extreme 88 to hold that where there is any
conflict of evidence, the case must be decided by the jury. This rule
would limit the application of judgment non obstante veredicto to
cases where no evidence supported the pleadings of a party, thus cur-
tailing to a decided extent the efficient disposition of causes by this
method.
The rule as stated in Hartig v. American Ice Co. applies only to
cases where the verdict is supported by a presumption. The law as to
those cases in which the verdict is supported by direct evidence is still
unsettled, in fact, seems more unsettled than ever, since the rule in
Lonzer v. Lehigh Valley R. R. may no longer be applied. It is pos-
sible that the Hartig rule may be enlarged to include those cases in
which the verdict is supported by direct evidence equal or inferior in
weight to a presumption. Such a decision, it is submitted, would
only succeed in evading the Scylla of the present problem to fall victim
of the Charybdis of determining what direct evidence is "equal or
inferior in weight to a presumption." The rule of the Hartig case can
hardly be useful in solving this minor 3 9 problem; the solution thereof
must be left to as yet unrendered decisions.
J.L.D.
CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM STATUTES BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT-At the close of the World War the legislatures of a number
of the states,' in their desire to curb Communist labor agitation, passed
a series of statutes known as "criminal syndicalism statutes." 2 These
"See cases supra notes 25, 27, 28.
""Minor" since in a considerable majority of the cases involving this
problem of granting judgment non obstante veredicto the verdict is based on
a presumption.
'For a list of states having these statutes see CG.AFE, FREEDOM OF SPEEca
(1920) 404.
' The statutes are practically uniform in phraseology. Idaho appears to
have supplied the original model. CHAFEE, supra note I, at 19o. II NEasoN's
ENCYCLOPEDIA (1913) 459, defines syndicalism as follows: "A revolutionary
working class movement, having for its aim the ownership and control by
industrial organizations of the means of production and distribution, thus mak-
ing the working man his own employer, and securing to him the entire product
of his labor. In the United States, syndicalism appeared as early as 1896, in a
revolt against the old trade union movement. Its principal exponent is the
Industrial Workers of the World (I. W. W.) organized in 19o5 under the
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statutes had as their object the punishment of those persons who advo-
cated "crime, physical violence, arson, destruction of property, sabo-
tage or other unlawful acts or methods as a means of effecting indus-
trial or political revolution." It was not the destruction of property
but only the incitement thereto that the statutes purported to deal
with. In the recent cases of Whitney v. California 8 and Fiske v.
Kansas 4 the Supreme Court of the United States passed upon the
constitutionality of the California and Kansas statutes.5
In the Whitney case the defendant was a member of the Com-
munist labor party which advocated the use of force to overthrow
capitalism and establish a working class government. In the Fiske
case, the defendant was a member of the Industrial Workers of the
World. That organization advocated that the workers of the world
organize as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of
production and abolish the wage system. The use of force was not
mentioned in their program. In both cases the defendants were con-
victed and adjudged guilty of the felony of syndicalism. They
appealed on the ground that the statutes denied them the liberty guar-
anteed by the United States Constitution.
The first question that arises is whether the Constitution places
any restrictions on the state legislatures in regard to freedom of
speech. Although freedom of speech is protected by the First
Amendment, it is well settled that the first ten amendments are merely
restrictions on Congress and in no way affect the states.8 Since the
First Amendment does not apply then the only other one that can pos-
sibly restrict the states is the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment. It has been decided by the Supreme Court that the Due
Process Clause has the same scope as the similar clause in the Fifth
leadership of Eugene V. Debs and W. D. Haywood." For an excellent dis-
cussion of the entire subject see OAKES, ORGAI IzED LABOR AND INDuSTIAL
CONFLICTS (927) i6o et seq.
'47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1927).
'47 Sup. Ct. 655 (927). Burns v. U. S., 47 Sup. Ct. 65o, decided the
same day as the Whitney and Fiske cases dealt with a conviction under the
California statute, but involved only the wording of a charge to a jury.
"The pertinent provisions of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act are:
"Sec. i. The term 'criminal syndicalism' as used in this act is hereby defined as
any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the com-
mission of crime, sabotage (which word is hereby defined as meaning wilful
and malicious physical damage or injury to physical property), or unlawful
acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any
political change.
"Sec. 2. Any person who . . . Organizes -or assists in organizing, or is
or knowingly becomes a member of, any organization, society, group or assem-
blage of persons, organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet
criminal syndicalism .... is guilty of a felony and punishable by impris-
onment."
'Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet 243 (U. S. 1833); Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410
(U. S. 1847); Smith v. Maryland, iS How. 71 (U. S. x855).
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Amendment.7  It is obvious that the Fifth Amendment does not gov-
ern freedom of speech because the First Amendment specifically deals
with it. Logically, therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment would not
be expected to apply to freedom of speech. In recent years, however,
the Supreme Court has gradually extended the meaning of the word
"liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment and has practically read free-
dom of speech into it." The question whether "liberty" included
freedom of speech first arose in the case of Patterson v. Colorado.'
In that case the Court expressly left the question undecided. The
next case where the question arose was that of Gilbert v. Minnesota 10
in which the Court stated that it did not consider it or decide it, but
simply conceded it for the purposes of the case. Then, in Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Cheek "- the Court stated that the Constitution "im-
poses upon the states no obligation to confer upon those within their
jurisdiction either the right o f free speech or the right of silence."
But in the case of Gitlow v. New York,12 the Court said "we may and
do assume that freedom of speech and of the press is one of the
fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the Due Proc-
ess Clause." It is not surprising therefore that, with but little com-
ment,' s it was assumed in the recent cases of Whitney v. California
and Fiske v. Kansas that the Fourteenth Amendment applied.
The principal question, and the one that most occupied the
Court's attention, was whether the statutes violated the constitutional
guaranty of free speech. Before the right of free speech can be
abridged, a real necessity for its abridgment must exist. The classic
test, which has also been applied to state statutes, is the one laid down
in the case of Schenck v. United States: 14 "the question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
"Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873); French v. Barber
Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324 (19Ol); Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310
(1903).
'See Warren, The New Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment (1926)
39 HARV. L. REv. 431, 458.
'205 U. S. 454 (19o7).
1"254 U. S. 325 (1920).
"1 259 U. S. 530, 538, 543 (1922).
=268 U. S. 652, 666 (1925).
'Brandeis, J., in Whitney v. California, supra note 3, at 647, said: "De-
spite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is set-
tled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to mat-
ters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all funda-
mental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal
Constitution from invasion by the states. The right of free speech, the right
to teach and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights."
2'249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919).
vent." The right of free speech does not imply unrestricted license 15
or the right of solicitation to commit a felony. 6 In applying the test
of the Schenck case, the courts have extended it in several instances.
In one case 17 the acts committed clearly showed no present danger,
yet it was decided to be within the statute. Therein lies the great
danger of the syndicalism laws. In the Whitney case the defendant
was convicted,' not for practicing or teaching the tenets of syndical-
ism but for associating with those who proposed to teach it.' The
Supreme Court held the California statute constitutional on the theory
that it was within the police power of the state to punish acts which
endangered the public peace and security.20 Such considerations did
not apply in the Fiske case, because there was no evidence that the
defendant or his organization advocated the use of crime, sabotage or
unlawful violence to overthrow the present industrial system. The
Supreme Court held the Kansas statute unconstitutional because "the
Act as applied was an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the
police power of the state, unwarrantably infringing the liberty of the
defendant in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 2' Both of these cases exhibit the difficulty the courts
are going to have in applying the syndicalism statutes. The test laid
down in the Schenck case does not define what is "a clear and present
danger." Consequently, courts will differ greatly as to when "a clear
and present danger" exists.22  That the right of free speech should
not be curbed until such danger exists was carefully pointed out by
Justice Brandeis,23 who concurred in the Whitney case on the ground
"'People v. Ruthenberg, 229 Mich. 315, 201 N. W. 358 (1925) ; Berg v.
State, 233 Pac. 497 (Okla. 1925).
"Com. v. Blankenstein, 81 Pa. Super. 340 (1923).
"State v. Moilen, 140 Minn. 112, 167 N. W. 345 (1918) (the basis of the
conviction was a set of posters two inches square bearing such legends as
"Beware Good Pay, Bum Work"; "The I. W. W. Never Forget"; "Sabotage";
"Industrial Unionism"; "Abolition of the Wage System"; "Join the I. W. W.
for Freedom"; "The I. W. W. Are Coming"; "Join the One Big Union"; all
posted on various buildings by the defendant).
"'The defendant was later pardoned by the governor of California. For
comment on the pardon see the OuTroox, June 29, 1927, p. 272; NE~v REPUB-
LIC, Aug. 10, 1927, P. 310.
"Accord: Main, J., in State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351, 365, 195 Pac.
211, 216 (1921).
"Cf. Edwards (1919) 89 CET. L. J. 336, 338: "That the California Act
is unconstitutional there is little room for doubt."
"47 Sup. Ct. at 657.
Cf. Brandeis, J., in Whitney v. California, supra note 3, at 648:
"This court has not yet fiked the standard by whith to determine when a dan-
ger shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed
present; and what degree of evil shall be deemed sufficiently substantial to
justify resort to abridgment of free speech and assembly as the means of pro-
tection."
=47 Sup. Ct. at 648.
NO TES 20I
2o UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
that there was evidence to support the conviction under the only issue
raised by the defendant's pleadings. He said-
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of
free speech and assembly. .... To justify suppression of
free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious
evil will result if free speech is practised., There must be rea-
sonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is immi-
nent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil
to be presented is a serious one. Every denunciation of existing
law tends in some measure to increase the probability that there
will be violation of it. . . But even advocacy of violation,
however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying
free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there
is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately
acted on. . . In order to support a finding of clear and
present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious
violence was to be expected or was advocated or that the past
conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then
contemplated. . . . To courageous, self-reliant men, with
confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied
through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing
from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the inci-
dence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall
before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert
the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied
is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can
justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be
reconciled with freedom. Such, in my opinibn, is the command
of the Constitution. . . . The fact that speech is likely to
result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough
to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of
serious injury to the State. Among free men, the deterrents
ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and pun-
ishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights
of free speechand assembly." 24
See also the opinion of Holmes, J., in Abrams v. U. S., 250 U. S. 616,
63o (gig). See also President Wilson's message of Dec. I, i919 in which he
said that Congress "should arm the Federal government with power to deal
in its criminal courts with those persons who by violent methods would abro-
gate our time-tested institutions. With the free expression of opinion and with
the advocacy of orderly political change, however fundamental, there must be
no interference, but towards passion and malevolence tending to incite crime
and insurrection under guise of political evolution there should be no leniency."
For comment on Justice Brandeis' opinion see the NEw REPUBLIC, June I,
1927, P. 34. Cf. State v. Laundy, 1O3 Ore. 443, 458, 2D4 Pac. 958, 964 (1922),
"The acts which shall not be advocated are acts which when done are of them-
selves unlawful by force of statutes other than the syndicalism statute. If
any one of those unlawful acts should be actually committed, the person so
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Practically all of these statutes were passed as emergency meas-
ures to alleviate a condition that arose directly after the World War
and which today exists to a much lessened extent. They illustrate the
operation of two powerful forces: the right of free speech as against
the right of property. That neither shall prevail at the expense of the
other has resulted in the test laid down in the Schenck case. It there-
fore becomes exceedingly questionable whether a real need for their
being on our statute books now exists.
C.P.
committing such unlawful act would be guilty of a crime; and surely no com-
petent person would think of attempting to argue that his personal liberties
are umconstitutionally curbed by legislation penalizing him for intentionally
injuring the person or property of another. Statutes penalizing those who
solicit or incite others to commit crimes are not innovations upon the criminal
law: . . . If it is within the power of the legislature to declare that a
given act, when done, constitutes a crime, then it is likewise within the power
of the legislature to declare that to advocate the doing of such act is a crime;
for if public policy requires the punishment of him who does an act, it like-
wise may require the punishment of him who incites the doing of such act,
whether the act is actually done or not."
